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Legally Speaking — What Does the HathiTrust Decision
Mean for Scholarly Publishers?
by Sanford G. Thatcher (8201 Edgewater Drive, Frisco, TX 75034; Phone: 214-705-1939) <sgt3@psu.edu>

F

air use has been tested in court with increasing frequency in recent years, and
many of these cases have revolved around
the question of whether the use challenged can
be reasonably viewed as “transformative” or
not. I traced the background in some earlier
articles in Against the Grain, especially “Is
‘Functional’ Use ‘Transformative’ and Hence
‘Fair’? A Copyright Conundrum” (June 2009):
https://scholarsphere.psu.edu/files/9880vr71h.
There I particularly focused on the different ways
the Ninth and Second Circuits had approached
the interpretation of fair use, which seemed to
portend eventual appeal to the Supreme Court.
Readers not already familiar with the background
might want to read that article before continuing with this one. I will also assume, in the
interests of brevity, that readers of this journal
will be generally familiar with HathiTrust, the
Authors Guild, and the origins of this suit, filed
in September 2011, which pitted these two main
parties (with support from others) against each
other in a battle to determine whether the mass
digitization begun by Google and built upon by
the HathiTrust participating libraries could be
construed as fair use. (It should be noted that
“transformative use” was not at issue in the suit
brought by three academic publishers against
Georgia State because Judge Evans did not
believe the copying under challenge there to be
transformative.)

Booklover
from page 45
One immediately feels they are reading a
tragic Italian opera — how will it end? This
is the surprise. Happy. Yes, a happy ending.
Costantino is released from prison after the real
killer makes a death bed confession. He returns
to his village struggling with his fate and the
fate of his now remarried wife. A clandestine
romance develops between Costantino and
Giovanna (Now the title is understood.), but
his thoughts turn to real murder.
“At last the rain was ceasing; it still fell
steadily, but more, now, like a gentle shower, while the wind had died down completely. It was cold, though, and the damp,
chill atmosphere hung over the cabin like
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The decision in the district court by Judge
Harold Baer in October 2012 had largely
favored the defendants, finding the alleged
infringing uses to be fair mainly because they
were all “transformative” and, further, made an
“invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts” (which echoes
the language of Article 1 of the Constitution in
providing the rationale for having a copyright
law in the first place). The uses in HathiTrust
involved making available the full texts of the
digitized works but only for the purposes of
text-mining and giving access to the physically
disabled. (The question of “orphan works” was
set aside as not yet ripe for judicial resolution.)
In making his ruling, the judge prominently
cited several cases decided in the Ninth Circuit,
thus for the first time narrowing the gap I had
perceived in my earlier article between the two
circuits on the interpretation of transformative
use. Judge Baer’s decision was followed by
another district court ruling in the Second Circuit
in November 2013 by Judge Denny Chin in the
parallel case that the Authors Guild had brought
against Google. Judge Chin also favorably
quoted from Ninth Circuit cases in reaching his
decision, which is now on appeal as well.
Much to my chagrin, in upholding Judge
Baer’s ruling with respect to fair use regarding
creation of a full-text searchable database, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has abandoned

earlier Second Circuit precedent and instead
bought into the controversial theory of the Ninth
Circuit (some of whose key decisions it also cites)
on functional use. Instead of insisting on viewing
the act of copying itself as needing to be creative,
the court has accepted the Ninth Circuit’s idea that
an otherwise “mechanical” act (similar to use of a
photocopy machine) can be fair use if it “allows
for” (the key words used by Judge Chin in his
ruling in the Google case) creative use later.
The precedent on which I had been relying in
my previous arguments was this passage written
by Judge Jon Newman in the Texaco case:
We would seriously question whether the
fair use analysis that has developed with
respect to works of authorship alleged to
use portions of copyrighted material is
precisely applicable to copies produced
by mechanical means. The traditional
fair use analysis, now codified in section
107, developed in an effort to adjust the
competing interests of the authors — the
author of the original copyrighted work
and the author of the secondary work that
“copies” a portion of the original work in
the course of producing what is claimed to
be a new work. Mechanical “copying” of
an entire document, made readily feasible
by the advent of xerography ..., is obviously an activity entirely different from

a heavy wet cloth. So unutterably dreary
were the weather and the surroundings
that Costantino, recalling the periods of his
most acute misery, could never remember
being so utterly and hopelessly wretched as
now. Not even on the day of the sentence,
not even on the day when they had told
him of the divorce, nor on that other day
of his return: for on every one of those
occasions, desperate as the outlook had
been there alway remained the hope of
better things in the life to come. Then his
conscience had been pure; but now, should
he go on living, he believed that he would
surely forfeit all hope in the life to come.
At times, goaded by this horror, he would
cry aloud, imploring death to come and
save him, as a terrified child cries for his
mother.”

What Costantino does not know at this
moment is that Giovanna’s husband Brontu
had died as a result of severe burns. Brontu
fell asleep near the kitchen fire after returning
home from a night of drunken foolishness.
Giovanna and Costantino are soon reunited.
More children are born, Brontu’s cruel mother’s
heart is softened. They live happily ever after.
“Giovanna is sewing, and hard by
Costantino works at his bench. No one
speaks, but the thoughts of all are turned
on the past. In the middle of the common
Mariedda (the child of Giovanna and
Brontu) and Malthineddu (the child of
Giovanna and Costantino) are playing
together with gurgles and shouts of
joyous laughter, as happy and unconcerned as the birds on the neighbouring
hedges.”

continued on page 48
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Legally Speaking
from page 46
creating a work of authorship. Whatever
social utility copying of this sort achieves,
it is not concerned with creative authorship (italics added).”
I believed this to be a correct interpretation
of Judge Pierre Leval’s idea of “transformative
use” as elaborated in his classic 1990 Harvard
Law Review article “Toward a Fair Us Standard”: http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/claw/
levalfrustd.htm. To my mind, the “creation”
of a full-text searchable database is no more
“creative” than pushing a button on a photocopy
machine and hence purely “mechanical” in nature. Of course, someone had to be creative in
devising the process for mass digitization, just as
someone had to create the photocopy machine in
the first place, but the actual use of the process
or machine is certainly not an act of human creativity itself, compared with the paradigm case
of a scholar quoting from a previous work in the
act of creating a new interpretation.
The Second Circuit, with this new decision,
has now effectively repudiated that line of reasoning and imported the Ninth Circuit approach.
In my view, this strikes a terrible blow to the
conceptual clarity of the notion of fair use. Now
courts will have to be engaged in an endless
procedure of differentiating among a variety of
functional uses as to which can be considered to
comport with fair use.
Unless Judge Leval somehow manages to
see the logic in Judge Newman’s ruling as a
faithful interpretation of his theory and then persuade his fellow panelists on the Google appeals
court to go along, I fear that the outcome of that
case will also further entrench the Ninth Circuit
view, which is doubly disastrous because this
agreement will then provide no motivation for
the Supreme Court to review any of these cases.
I explained in a letter I wrote to Judge Chin
in November 2013 where I think he went wrong
in his reasoning in the Google decision:
In your analysis, you quote from Pierre
Leval’s classic article suggesting that a
new work is “transformative” if it “adds
something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message.”
You go on to say:
Google Books does not supersede
or supplant books because it is not
a tool to be used to read books.
Instead, it “adds value to the original” and allows for “the creation of
new information, new aesthetics,
new insights and understandings.”
The key mistake here is located in the
words “allow for.” That is not what Leval
said. He said that the act of fair use itself
must consist in “altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message,”
and Google’s computer-created indexing
does not do that; there is no creativity in
the functioning of Google’s computer
algorithm. It is, as Judge Newman put it,
merely a “mechanical” procedure.
Why is this so important? It is important
because there are those who will exploit
the notion of re-purposing, which cap-
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tures one part of Leval’s argument, to do
real damage to the Constitutional purpose
of copyright. Like the Ninth Circuit, they
will ignore the idea that the new work
must itself come from an act of human
creativity that adds new meaning, etc.
But the HathiTrust decision has now gone
down this same road, and I suspect the Second
Circuit will follow in this direction in the decision on appeal in the Google case.
However, the news is not all bad. In particular, the HathiTrust decision on appeal has challenged the notion that social utility itself suffices
to render a use fair, in this respect echoing Judge
Newman’s reasoning.
Contrary to what the district court
implied, a use does not become transformative by making an “invaluable
contribution to the progress of science and
cultivation of the arts.” … Added value
or utility is not the test: a transformative
work is one that serves a new and different function from the original work and
is not a substitute for it.
In this respect, the Second Circuit seems to
be departing a bit from the Ninth Circuit approach, which famously proclaimed functional
utility of a search process in the Perfect 10 case
to be even more transformative than parody.
“Google’s use of thumbnails is highly transformative” (emphasis added). How did it justify
this hyperbole? Not only does a search engine
provide “social benefit by incorporating an original work into a new work, namely, an electronic
reference tool. Indeed, a search engine may be
more transformative than a parody because a
search engine provides an entirely new use for
the original work, while a parody typically has
the same entertainment purpose as the original
work.” I trust that, with its repudiation of Judge
Baer’s obeisance to general social utility, the
Second Circuit would not go as far as the Ninth
in enthroning pure functional re-purposing as
“highly” transformative, even more than parody (which of course directly involves human
creativity).
It is further comforting that the court did not
view digitization for the purpose of providing
access to the print-disabled to be “transformative” either. And its treatment of “audience”
here may help university presses continue our
fight against the ARL Code’s attempt to consider
re-purposing of scholarly works, novels, etc., for
a different audience of students as transformative
and hence fair. The court affirms the importance
of the fourth factor, noting that “the only market
harms that count are the ones that are caused
because the secondary use serves as a substitute
for the original, not when the secondary use is
transformative.” By denying that digitization
for the print-disabled is transformative, and by
holding that just expanding usage to a larger audience is not transformative, the Second Circuit
presumable would find the ARL argument to be
unpersuasive, especially since digitized copies
of monographs, novels, etc., would clearly be
“substitutes” for the originals.
Here the Second Circuit reasons in much
the way that David Nimmer does in presenting
his theory of functional use. As I argued in my
earlier essay:
Nimmer on Copyright proposes a “functional test” as a means for deciding when

certain uses are fair: “if, regardless of
medium, the defendant’s work, although
containing substantially similar material,
performs a different function than that of
the plaintiff’s, the defense of fair use may
be invoked.” One example given is where
“unauthorized reproduction of chorus lyrics of songs were held noninfringing fair
use where such reproductions appeared
in magazine articles” rather than in sheet
music competing for the same market as
the original. This “functional test” was
inspired by a suggestion from Judge
Richard Posner, who urged the recognition that “copying that is complementary
to the copyrighted work…is fair use, but
copying that is a substitute for the copyrighted work…, or for derivative works
from the copyrighted work, is not fair
use.” This approach, though it may seem
superficially similar to the Ninth Circuit’s
because of the reference to functionality,
is in fact quite different. Rather than being
tortured out of the notion of “transformative” use, this “functional test” is instead
“viewed as an expansion of the fourth fair
use factor…[and] vindicates the oft-cited
assertion…that that factor emerges as the
central fair use determinant, in result if
not always in stated rationale.” Nimmer,
like Weinreb, looks at some Supreme
Court cases whose outcomes appear to be
quite puzzling without being understood
in terms of this “functional test.”
Consider the four Supreme Court
cases decided under the fair use
doctrine in the decade beginning
in 1984. Each of the three initial
fair use factors defies characterization that can consistently explain
the court’s ultimate conclusion in
those cases. The first factor reveals conflicting impulses, whether scrutinized as to commercial use
or to transformative use, or according to the statutory preamble.
On the commercial scale, Nation
and Abend [Stewart v. Abend,
1990] both disallow fair use for
commercial uses, whereas Sony
allows it in a noncommercial context; but Campbell allows fair use
for commercial exploitation. On
the transformative scale, Campbell weighs in favor of fair use
for a productive use, yet Nation
and Abend rule against fair use
for what is admittedly a productive
use; even more strangely, Sony
allows fair use for a nonproductive
use. In terms of the presumptively
fair activities enumerated in the
preamble to Section 107, the
activity in Campbell constituted
“criticism, comment,” and hence,
inclines towards fair use, whereas
the activity in Abend met none of
the preamble specifications and
was held unfair, both as expected,
yet the activity in Sony fell into
none of the preamble categories,
and was nonetheless held fair;
completely confounding expecta-

continued on page 49

<http://www.against-the-grain.com>

Questions & Answers — Copyright Column
Column Editor: Laura N. Gasaway (Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School
of Law, Chapel Hill, NC 27599; Phone: 919-962-2295; Fax: 919-962-1193) <laura_gasaway@unc.edu>
www.unc.edu/~unclng/gasaway.htm
QUESTION: A medical librarian in a nonprofit hospital asks about republishing a chart
or graph in a book or journal article written
by a doctor on staff. The content is found in
publications to which the library subscribes
that are covered by its Copyright Clearance
Center license. Does this republication require permission from the copyright holder?
ANSWER: Because the library has a CCC
license, the answer to this question is controlled
by the CCC license. Typically, the license permits sharing of content within the organization
on intranets, in newsletters, and notification
services but not outside of hospital employees.
Republication in outside publications usually is
not covered in the annual copyright license and
requires permission for republication from the
copyright holder, and the payment of royalties
may be required. The CCC license for the
organization should be consulted, however,
to determine if this outside republication is
covered.
QUESTION: A college librarian asks
whether graphs, tables, and charts are subject
to copyright protection. Or is the information
(facts) contained in them not so much created
as observed? If copyright protection does
extend to data, is manipulating published data
sufficiently transformative to become fair use?
ANSWER: Graphs, tables, and charts are
graphic works which normally are protected
by copyright. However, copyright extends to
the expression of facts and data but not to the
facts and data themselves. The crucial determination is what might be protected in one of
these works. Typically, it is the selection of
data or facts, the compilation, and the graphic
design that qualifies for copyright protection.
Someone else could take the data and create
another way of depicting that data and produce
a new work which does not infringe on the
earlier chart or graph. This is not even fair use
but is simply the creation of a new work based
on facts or data.
QUESTION: An academic librarian inquires about the impact of the recent dispute
publishers are having with Amazon over
pre-orders and asks if there is a copyright
issue.

ANSWER: This dispute has been widely
publicized by Hachette and other publishers
(for one perspective on the publication see Berkshire Publishing’s description of the problem at
http://us1.campaign-archive1.com/?u=f02106ebaeb66b1fb28bf4adf&id=35f076f817&e=78ddc32ffc). The dispute is actually a disagreement
over distribution of books, how it is done, when,
for what price, and at what discount to the
distributor (Amazon). Most authors who have
written about this have sided with their publishers. While distribution is an exclusive right
of the author, it is typically the publisher that
exercises the distribution right for books since
most authors have transferred the distribution
right to the publisher. Further, authors seldom
have the ability to distribute the printed copies
of their works. The argument is not over who
has the right to distribute the works but the terms
under which that will occur, so it is not really a
copyright issue.
QUESTION: A librarian in a for-profit
educational institution is reviewing the library’s
copyright policies and asks about the following
statement concerning printed material
(archives). “Librarians may make up to three
copies “solely for the purpose of replacement
of a copy that is damaged, deteriorating, lost,
or stolen.” Copies must contain copyright
information. Archiving rights allow libraries
to share with other libraries one-of-a-kind and
out-of-print books.” If one makes a copy for
the reasons stated in the first quoted sentence,
is that copy solely for archival purposes and
thus must remain on the shelves, or may it be
circulated as if it were the original?
ANSWER: The first two sentences are
absolutely correct. They come from section
108(c) of the Copyright Act. Where the
third sentence comes from is unclear.
Libraries are permitted to replace lost,
damaged, stolen, deteriorating or
obsolete copies of works after they
make a good faith effort to acquire
an unused copy at a fair price. A
photocopied replacement copy may
be circulated and used just as the
original is used. If one of the three
copies made is digital, however,

tions, Nation dealt with
protected “news reporting,” but nonetheless
held against fair use.
The second factor likewise produces disparate results. Abend
unsurprisingly disallows fair use for a highly creative work,
yet Campbell and Sony allow the use for similarly creative
works; and Nation seems totally out of kilter, disallowing
fair use for a factual work. The third factor is likewise mixed.
Campbell allows fair use for less than total copying, but
Nation and Abend both disallow fair use for less than total
copying; by contrast, Sony allows fair use for total copying!
Nimmer goes on to consider how the “functional test” fares better as

Legally Speaking
from page 48
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the digital copy may not be used outside the
premises of the library.
Libraries do not have a general “archiving
right.” While making a copy (sharing) of a oneof-a kind or out-of-print work at the request of another library which is exercising its section 108(c)
rights to replace a lost, damaged, etc., work would
be permissible; “sharing” is not supported by the
Copyright Act. It is possible that this statement
is referring to section 108(b) which relates only
to unpublished works and not to either out-ofprint or one-of-a-kind works. Under this section
libraries are allowed to make up to three copies of
an unpublished work for preservation or security
or for deposit for research in another library. The
same in-library use restriction applies to a digital
copy that is one of the three.
QUESTION: The same librarian also asks
about making copies of television broadcasts.
The old policy states: “Broadcasts of tapes
made from television programs may be used
for instructions. Cable channel programs may
be used with permission.”
ANSWER: This is a very odd statement.
The first sentence is not correct even for nonprofit educational institutions! Section 108(f)
(3) permits libraries to record television news
programs, but only those. The statute does not
restrict it to broadcast programs, but it is likely
that in 1976 this was what was intended. So,
recording television programs even for nonprofit educational institutions outside of the
news must be with permission. Some networks
permit schools to record and reuse programs,
however. Other networks sell video copies of
programs which includes the right to perform
them within the educational institution. Under
section 110(1) of the Act, nonprofit educational
institutions may perform audiovisual works
in face-to-face teaching as a part of a
class, but this section is not applicable to a for-profit institution. The
Copyright Clearance Center,
in partnership with the Motion
Picture Licensing Corporation,
now licenses the performance of
television programs, and this may
be the best alternative for this
organization.

an explanation for the outcomes of these four cases and concludes:
“then the fourth factor, as expanded by the functional test, is currently the most reliable touchstone for performing fair use analysis.”
I think this kind of functional test supports the argument I have made
against the ARL Code’s position, as in my essay “On the Use and Abuse
of Transformative Use”: https://scholarsphere.psu.edu/files/sf268573n. It
seems to be compatible with the Second Circuit’s view.
So, in sum, while I regret the further muddying of the waters of conceptual clarity about transformative use that the Second Circuit has accepted,
I believe that it still leaves open opportunities for us scholarly publishers
to resist the most radical interpretations of transformative use that could
cause us the most economic harm.
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